Nick Nocton
Partner

Nick Nocton is a Partner in the Innovation Department and heads the firm’s top-ranked Betting and Gaming Group and Interactive Entertainment division. With over 25 years’ experience in the gambling and games sectors, he advises on commercial and corporate transactions, compliance and regulatory matters, including investigations and enforcement proceedings. He is particularly known for advising on the regulatory aspects of multi-jurisdictional transactions and complex investigations.

 

Nick also advises on emerging technologies and product innovation, including the use of crypto-assets and virtual currencies in gaming, and on prediction markets, prize competitions, skill gaming, sweepstakes and social gaming.

 

Nick is recognised by Chambers UK and Chambers Global as a “gaming and betting expert” and a “tremendous lawyer”. Legal 500 ranks him as a Leading Individual and includes him in its Hall of Fame. He is also a member of the International Association of Gaming Advisors and the International Masters of Gaming Law.

Public health, the growth of the Black Market and a landmark consumer judgment

The Gambling Act 2005 was introduced following the publication of the Budd Report, which identified a need to modernise the regulation of gambling in Great Britain and recommended that it be recognised as a legitimate mainstream entertainment activity, albeit one which required careful regulation, including to protect vulnerable people. This led to a period of unprecedented investment and growth. Britain’s was to become the world’s leading regulated gambling market.

Now, two decades on from the introduction of the Gambling Act, the position is somewhat different. In 2023, following the Gambling Act Review, the then Government published its white paper, High Stakes: Gambling Reform for the Digital Age which contained a raft of recommended reforms of the underlying legislation. Following this, and myriad other changes to compliance and tax obligations, including a very significant increase in remote gambling duties in April 2026, the remote gambling industry in the UK is somewhat embattled.

The growth in remote gambling across the last two decades, and the perceived ubiquity of gambling advertising, have raised legitimate questions regarding proportionality and safer gambling. Even so, the industry has had to cope with the imposition of extraordinary amounts of regulatory obligations.

In recent years, the UK remote gambling industry has had to deal with restrictions on bonusing, wagering requirements, direct marketing and promotions, High Value Customers, game design, online stake limits, the unofficial but de facto imposition of “affordability” requirements, regularly increasing customer interaction requirements, the imposition of a statutory levy, financial vulnerability checks, and now the prospect of financial risk assessments (which the industry considers to be an affordability check in all but name).

Regulated operators have had to massively increase their investment in compliance to cope with these ever-increasing regulatory obligations. At the same time, the result of these changes has been to reduce the volume (and volatility) of gambling spend by the consumer.

There are of course very good reasons to regulate gambling, particularly to prevent harm to children and other vulnerable persons. Nobody in the licensed industry would argue against proportionate regulation and the need to continue to protect vulnerable consumers. However, the pendulum appears to have swung too far the other way and the balance necessary for a sustainable regulated industry, which serves the interests of all consumers (including those most vulnerable), is being lost.

This increasing regulatory burden is symptomatic of a shift in recent years to a “public health” approach to gambling regulation and policy, which treats gambling-related harm as a population-wide issue and not one which is specific to particular vulnerable individuals or categories of person. This approach treats gambling as comparable to alcohol and tobacco (notwithstanding the obvious distinctions), and advocates the restriction of access and promotion and early intervention as a means of restricting potential harm. This has two inevitable results. The first is the demonisation of the industry, and (to some extent) many of its consumers. For example, the new Statutory Levy will not fund any research which is associated with the industry (even where independence safeguards are in place). Meanwhile, the Commission’s interest in “lived experience” focuses on those who have experienced gambling harm, to the effective exclusion of the vast majority of consumers who not only are not harmed by gambling, but who positively enjoy it. This is in part because the regulator now attributes harm, or potential harm, to any gambling spend at all.

The Commission’s widening focus on “harm” and “potential harm” is driven by a wider governmental and supra-national adoption of this public health approach. One hugely significant result has been that the Commission’s own gambling prevalence survey now estimates “problem” (i.e. harmful and potentially harmful) gambling at a level several multiples higher than that of the highly-regarded NHS survey which it replaced. Different methodologies, different outcomes, which are then seized upon by those who wish to restrict the industry further.

This public health approach has also resulted in the significant tax increases for remote gambling, especially remote gaming, mentioned above, further restricting margins and commercial opportunity.

However, the second inevitable result of the public health approach, which is now playing out in Great Britain, is the marginalisation of many of the most vulnerable consumers.

As the regulated industry shoulders an ever-increasing compliance and tax burden, operators are no longer able to offer the same incentives to attract and retain customers they once did and are required to limit players to spend levels which are lower than many such players would prefer. In extreme cases, the regulated operator is encouraged to cease to serve a player who may be suffering harm, even if that player does not wish to self-exclude. Whilst there is logic to this progression, where do these players (and those players looking for more generous incentives and wagering requirements, or simply less restrictive stake limits) go to play? The answer is that many of them end up in the “black market”, where unregulated gambling operators operate largely unrestricted, do not offer player protections, and are not burdened by the need to pay up to 40% of their revenues in gambling duties.

This even includes players who have self-excluded, as the infamous online advertising of “non Gamstop” online casinos demonstrates. Whilst there are other drivers, the growth of the black market is an inevitable result of the restriction of the regulated market, as acknowledged by both the Gambling Commission and the government during the Gambling Act review, and by the Office for Budget Responsibility in relation to the Government’s decision to raise gambling taxes.

Whilst the Commission is receiving further powers to seek to restrict illegal gambling, fighting the offshore unregulated market is akin to a scaled-up game of whack-a-mole. What is required is not only a regulator with greater powers, but also with a more enlightened view on the value of a commercially sustainable regulated market, and the willingness to push back against calls for greater and more restrictions. The Commission does this occasionally, but it also has a habit of imposing new compliance requirements without first having properly assessed the impact of previous changes. The industry will be pleased that the imposition of financial risk assessments was paused in June 2026, but this was only after a concerted campaign to highlight the uncertain output of the pilot scheme, and the need for appropriate analysis before the imposition of yet more restrictions.

The Commission has worked hard in recent times to improve its relationship with the industry, and has made good progress, but there is still a significant whiff of distrust (even dislike) of the very industry it exists to regulate. The industry, and the consumer, would benefit from a period of regulatory stability.

Tightening sport sponsorship rules

The Gambling Act Review white paper also included various proposals to reform gambling advertising. However, the proposals stopped short of imposing formal legal restrictions on sports sponsorship. At the time the government recognised the value of gambling sponsorship to sports, and the potentially serious financial implications that any restriction would have, and acknowledged the then newly-announced agreement by the Premier League to ban front-of-shirt gambling logos. However, it did set clear expectations that a Code of Conduct (which was already in draft form) should be adopted by sports’ governing bodies in relation to gambling sponsorship.

The Premier League ban on shirt-front sponsorship takes effect now that the 2025/6 season is over. Gambling brands may still appear in stadia and on shirt sleeves, but the prime real estate of the shirt front is now out of bounds, albeit by voluntary agreement.

However, anomalies remain. Clubs have generally accepted advertising by gambling brands even where the brand owner is not itself the holder of a British licence, but is operated on a “white label” basis. This has been exploited by numerous brands in recent years, although following the surrender of a leading white label provider’s licence in 2025, several brands remained as prominent Premier League club sponsors even without the justification of third party’s licence.

Indeed, the law currently does not prevent the advertising of a gambling brand which is not subject to a British licence at all, provided the relevant facilities are not available to players in Great Britain. Section 330 of the Gambling Act prohibits the advertising of unlawful gambling. In this context, gambling is unlawful if a licence would be required for it to take place lawfully as advertised and no licence is in place, but remote gambling only requires a licence if it takes place using relevant equipment located in Great Britain, or if it is used by persons located here. Moreover, unless the equipment is in Great Britain, the offence will only be committed if the relevant person knew or ought to have known that the facilities would be used in Great Britain. Similarly, it is a defence to a charge under section 330 for the person to have reasonably believed that the advertised gambling was lawful. Accordingly, if the operator takes reasonable steps to prevent access to remote gambling by British consumers, it should be possible for their brand to be advertised without the commission of an offence.

Understandably, this has been the cause of significant tension, and especially so now, as the regulated industry faces such regulatory and commercial pressure. Accordingly, in February 2026 the government announced a consultation proposing the prohibition of sponsorship by unlicensed operators as part of wider measures to tackle the illegal market. Regrettably, such change always takes time, but the move is nevertheless welcome.

However, the consultation has not yet been launched (June 2026). If the Government does decide to go ahead with the proposed ban, it is likely that this will require the creation of a new statutory offence (or amendment of the current offence under section 330). This will require parliamentary time – meaning the potential timing for a ban becomes even less clear.

Gibson v TSE Malta Ltd (t/a. Betfair)

Meanwhile, in December 2025, the Court of Appeal adjudicated in the most significant consumer claim against the UK gambling industry in a generation. Mr Gibson had been a VIP customer of Betfair over a decade (2009 to 2019) and lost a total of almost £1.5 million. He claimed that Betfair knew or ought to have known (through monitoring his gambling and through its various interactions with him) that he was a problem gambler, that it was under a duty to prevent him from making such losses in the circumstances, and had failed to do so. He sued for breach of contract, negligence and breach of statutory duty, and also argued that in circumstances where the Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice (LCCP) attaching to Betfair’s licence had been breached, the contract was void ab initio. The breach of statutory duty claim was withdrawn, and Mr Gibson went on to lose at first instance because, despite finding that he had been a problem gambler from 2015 onwards, the judge held that Betfair had neither known this, nor should have known this (including because Mr Gibson denied it). The judge further held that Betfair had applied appropriate policies at relevant times to comply with its regulatory obligations, was not in breach of the LCCP, and did not owe Mr Gibson an actionable duty of care. Finally, the judge ruled that, even if such a duty had been established, causation had not been proven.

Mr Gibson appealed, arguing that the judge had erred in each of the following findings: (i) that Betfair neither knew nor should have known that he was a problem gambler, (ii) that there had been no breach of the LCCP, (iii) that Betfair owed no duty to him and had not been negligent, (iv) that causation had not been proven, and (v) that in circumstances where the LCCP had been breached the contract was not void ab initio.

The Court of Appeal found that it was reasonable for the judge to have concluded that Betfair did not know nor ought to have known that Mr Gibson had a gambling problem (including because Mr Gibson had misled Betfair in this regard). Given this finding, it was not necessary to consider whether a duty had arisen, whether Betfair had been negligent, nor whether causation had been proven.

However, an interesting aspect of the judgment was the Court’s conclusion (obiter) that the Gambling Act does not imply that a gambling contract shall be void if the operator does not comply with the LCCP (i.e. void for illegality). The scheme of the Act is such that in those circumstances, the operator may be subject to regulatory sanction. To find that the underlying contract is void would lead to chaos, because if in such circumstances a losing gambler’s losses were unenforceable, the same would be true of a winning gambler’s winnings. Such a conclusion would be absurd and inconsistent with the scheme of the Act.

The case was a resounding victory for the operator and welcomed by the industry, which seldom litigates with its customers, but the clarity this case brought was nevertheless very welcome.